It was 20 minutes into the new day, 31 July, when PTF-3 and PTF-6, both under the command of Lieutenant Sonconsidered one of the best boat skippers in the covert fleetreached Hon Me and began their run at the shore. The U.S. ships were supposed to remain well outside North Vietnams claimed five nautical mile territorial limit. In an effort to increase pressure on North Vietnam, several Norwegian-built fast patrol boats (PTFs) were covertly purchased and transferred to South Vietnam. In Saigon, General William C. Westmoreland, the new commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), approved of the plan, and SOG began testing 81-mm mortars, 4.5-inch rockets, and recoilless rifles aboard the boats. The most comprehensive and authoritative history site on the Internet. You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site. The Tonkin Gulf Incident in the past two decades has been treated by at least three full-scale studies, dealt with at length by Congressional committees and extensively referenced in general histories, presidential memoirs and textbooks on the U.S. legislative function. Gulf of Tonkin incident - Wikipedia During a meeting at the White House on the evening of 4 August, President Johnson asked McCone, "Do they want a war by attacking our ships in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin? Three days later, she rendezvoused with a tanker just east of the DMZ before beginning her intelligence- gathering mission up the North Vietnamese coast. Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. Both U.S. ships opened fire on the radar contacts, but reported problems maintaining a lock on the tracking and fire control solution. The first Desoto Mission was conducted by USS Craig (DD-885) in March 1964. Hickman, Kennedy. Office of the Historian THIS SECOND volume of the U.S. Navy's multivolume history of the Vietnam War is bound in the same familiar rich blue buckram that has styled official Navy histories since the Civil War and hence resembles its predecessors. PTF-2 had mechanical troubles and had to turn back, but the other boats made it to their rendezvous point off the coast from Vinh Son. In late 2007, that information was finally made public when an official National Security Agency (NSA) history of signals intelligence (SIGINT) in Vietnam, written in 2002, was released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. As a result, the ships offshore were able to collect valuable information on North Vietnamese military capabilities. Two nearly identical episodes six weeks apart; two nearly opposite responses. Although Washington officials did not believe Hanoi would attack the Desoto ships again, tensions ran high on both sides, and this affected their respective analyses of the events to come. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin and the Vietnam War. I would not suggest that he learned from the Gulf of Tonkin incident so much as that he got from it exactly what he wanted, which was an enormous bump in approval ratings 30 percent overnight, says historian Chris Oppe. Gulf of Tonkin - Wikipedia HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 25,000 articles originally published in our nine magazines. The Vietnam War buff will find it fascinating for its wealth of detail carefully set down in understated prose (a welcome relief, I might add, from the hysterical tone that marks much Vietnam War writing). A subsequent review of the SIGINT reports revealed that this later interceptMcNamaras smoking gunwas in fact a follow-on, more in-depth report of the August 2 action. These warning shots were fired and the P-4s launched a torpedo attack. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. All missed, probably because the North Vietnamese had fired too soon. ThoughtCo, Feb. 16, 2021, thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345. The NSA report exposes translation and analytical errors made by the American SIGINT analystserrors that convinced the naval task force and national authorities that the North had ordered a second attack on August 4, and thus led Maddoxs crew to interpret its radar contacts and other information as confirmation that the ship was again under attack. To subscribe to Vietnam Magazine, click here! In November of 2001, the LBJ Presidential library and museum released tapes of phone conversations with the President and then Defense 4. In July, General Westmoreland asked that Desoto patrols be expanded to cover 34A missions from Vinh Son north to the islands of Hon Me, Hon Nieu, and Hon Mat, all of which housed North Vietnamese radar installations or other coastwatching equipment. He headed seaward hoping to avoid a confrontation until daybreak, then returned to the coast at 1045, this time north of Hon Me. The North Vietnamese believed that, although they had lost one boat, they had deterred an attack on their coast. Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident - ThoughtCo Over the next 12 hours, as the president's team scrambledto understand what hadhappened and to organize a response, the facts remained elusive. The U.S. in-theater SIGINT assets were limited, as was the number of Vietnamese linguists. In the days leading up to the first incident of August 2nd, those secret operations had intensified.. In turn, that means The publicity caused by the Tonkin Gulf incident and the subsequent resolution shifted attention away from covert activities and ended high-level debate over the wisdom of secret operations against North Vietnam. 8. 8. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964, FRUS, Vietnam, 1964, p. 603. Gulf of Tonkin incident Facts McNamara was ready to respond. The only opposition came from a few scattered machine guns on shore, but they did no damage. While there was some doubt in Washington regarding the second attack, those aboard Maddox and Turner Joy were convinced that it had occurred. For the maritime war specialist, it is of course invaluable. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt, agreed and suggested that a U.S. Navy ship could be used to vector 34A boats to their targets.6. But on 7 January, the Seventh Fleet eased the restriction, allowing the destroyers to approach to within four milesstill one mile beyond North Vietnamese territorial waters as recognized by the United States. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." He readthe chiefs a cable from the captain of the Maddox. In the summer of 1964, President Lyndon Baines Johnson needed a pretext to commit the American people to the already expanding covert war in South East Asia. Conducted under the nationally approved Operations Plan, OPLAN-34A, the program required the intelligence community to provide detailed intelligence about the commando targets, the Norths coastal defenses and related surveillance systems. He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." The first critic report from Phu Bai reached Washington at about 0740 hours, Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another North Vietnamese attack. Kennedy Hickman is a historian, museum director, and curator who specializes in military and naval history. AND THERE is the fact of Vietnam's position today. Seventh Fleet reduced it to 12 nautical miles. Each sides initial after-action review was positive. He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. He also requested air support. Based on the intercepts, Captain John J. Herrick, the on-scene mission commander aboard nearby Turner Joy, decided to terminate Maddoxs Desoto patrol late on August 1, because he believed he had indications the ship was about to be attacked.. The disclaimer is required, if for no other reason than because of Chapter 15, "The American Response to the Gulf of Tonkin Attacks," about which more later. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History Case Closed: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - HistoryNet In 1996 Edward Moises book Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War presented the first publicly released concrete evidence that the SIGINT reporting confirmed the August 2 attack, but not the alleged second attack of August 4. The Pyramid and All-Seeing Eye . The threat removed, Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly forces. Badly damaged, the boat limped home. These secret intelligence-gathering missions and sabotage operations had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961, but in January 1964, the program was transferred to the Defense Department under the control of a cover organization called the Studies and Observations Group (SOG). Just before midnight, the four boats cut their engines. Signals Intelligence is a valuable source but it is not perfect. Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). The intelligence community, including its SIGINT component, responded with a regional buildup to support the increase in U.S. operational forces. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 IV-2 to IV-4. The Johnson Administration initially limited its response to a terse diplomatic note to Hanoi, the first-ever U.S. diplomatic note to that government. Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. On 7 August, the Senate passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, allowing the administration greater latitude in expanding the war by a vote of 88 to 2. McNamara did not mention the 34A raids.15. Moises book, however, was based on only the few SIGINT reports he was able to obtain through the Freedom of Information Act. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History The North Vietnamese did not react, probably because no South Vietnamese commando operations were underway at that time. Until the ICC investigation blew over a week later, the commandos camped on a small pier. There was no way to get a commando team ashore to plant demolition charges; they would have do what damage they could with the boats guns.3 The Geneva Conference in 1954 was intended to settle outstanding issues following the end of hostilities between France and the Viet Minh at the end of the First Indochina War. William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part II, 1961-1964, pp. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided to resume Maddoxs Desoto patrol, but at a greater distance from the coast, accompanied by Turner Joy and supported by aircraft from Ticonderoga. In the end the Navy agreed, and in concert with MACV, took steps to ensure that "34A operations will be adjusted to prevent interference" with Desoto patrols.7 This did not mean that MACV did not welcome the information brought back by the Desoto patrols, only that the two missions would not actively support one another. Conspiracy 1. Suffice to say here that the version as presented here by Marolda and Fitzgerald is highly credible and completely plausible, and I for one am persuaded of its correctness. On July 31, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox commenced a Desoto patrol off North Vietnam. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. You've read 1 out of 5 free articles of Naval History this month. The NSA report is revealing. At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. And so, in the course of a single day, and operating on imperfect information,Johnson changedthe trajectory of the Vietnam War. Most uncertainty has long centered on the alleged second attack of August 4. "11 For the Navys official account stating that both incidents occurred and that 34A and Desoto were "entirely distinct," see Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. PRX is a 501(c)(3) organization recognized by the IRS: #263347402. With that false foundation in their minds, the on-scene naval analysts saw the evidence around them as confirmation of the attack they had been warned about. The conspiracy theory has been dying for several years, and this work will probably be a stake through its heart. ThoughtCo. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution | History, Facts, & Significance The Gulf of Tonkin act became more controversial as opposition to the war mounted. In the years covered here, the Navy was generally known throughout the U.S. Mission in Saigon for being in the housekeeping business, operating supply warehouses, and running the officer clubs, PXs and other amenities, an inevitable part of the American military's baggage. But only a few minutes later, McNamara was back on the line with news of a second incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. The truth about 'False Flags' from Nazi Germany to the Vietnam War This was the only time covert operations against the North came close to being discussed in public. Carl Otis Schuster, U.S. Navy (ret.) Early Military Career The SIGINT intercepts also detected that the North Vietnamese coastal radar stations were tracking Maddox and reporting its movements to the outbound torpedo boats. :: Douglas Pike, director of the Indochina Studies Program at the University of California-Berkeley, is the author of the forthcoming "Vietnam and the U.S.S.R.: Anatomy of an Alliance.". 426-436. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. Was the collapse of the Twin Towers on 911 terrorism are a controlled demolition. He spoke out against banning girls education. Surprised by the North Vietnamese response, Johnson decided that the United States could not back away from the challenge and directed his commanders in the Pacific to continue with the Desoto missions. By 1400 hours EDT, the president had approved retaliatory strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases for the next morning, August 5, at 0600 local time, which was 1900 EDT on August 4 in Washington. Although the total intelligence picture of North Vietnams actions and communications indicates that the North Vietnamese did in fact order the first attack, it remains unclear whether Maddox was the originally intended target. the Gulf of Tonkin Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964, FRUS 1964, vol. Two days later, August 4, Maddox returned to the area, supported by the destroyer Turner Joy (DD-951). In Saigon, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor objected to the halt, saying that "it is my conviction that we must resume these operations and continue their pressure on North Vietnam as soon as possible, leaving no impression that we or the South Vietnamese have been deterred from our operations because of the Tonkin Gulf incidents." Those same reports were shown to the select congressional and senate committees that also investigated the incident. Then, everyones doubts were swept away when a SIGINT intercept from one of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats reported the claim that it had shot down two American planes in the battle area. The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. Declassified NSA documents show that US intelligence members concealed relevant reports from Congress to push the narrative of a second attack. Neither Herricks doubts nor his reconnaissance request was well received, however. 14. 12. This along with flawed signals intelligence from the National Security Agency led Johnson to order retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam. No one was hurt and little damage wasdone in the attack, but intercepted cables suggested a second attack might be imminent. Today, it is believed that this second attack did not occur and was merely reports from jittery radar and sonar operators, but at the time it was taken as evidence that Hanoi was raising the stakes against the United States. No actual visual sightings by Maddox.". U.S. and South Vietnamese warships intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and simultaneously shelled: Hon Nieu Island, 4 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province [and] Hon Me Island, 12 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province." The two boats headed northeast along the same route they had come, then turned south for the run back to South Vietnam. 15. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1992), p. 59. For the rest of the war they would be truly secretand in the end they were a dismal failure. The North also protested the South Vietnamese commando raid on Hon Me Island and claimed that the Desoto Mission ships had been involved in that raid. Over the next few years, Johnson used the resolution to rapidly escalate American involvement in the Vietnam War. On 30 July, Westmoreland revised the 34A maritime operations schedule for August, increasing the number of raids by "283% over the July program and 566% over June. President Johnson ordered a halt to all 34A operations "to avoid sending confusing signals associated with recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin." WebJoe Rogan interview on the 911 Conspiracy Theory. Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. Subscribe to receive our weekly newsletter with top stories from master historians. Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964. The commander also added the requirement of collecting photographic intelligence of ships and aircraft encountered, as well as weather and hydrographic information. https://www.thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345 (accessed March 4, 2023). Alerted to the threat, Herrick requested air support from the carrier USS Ticonderoga. The USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin is shown in 1963. Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident. He is the author of. Codenamed Desoto, they were special U.S. Navy patrols designed to eavesdrop on enemy shore-based communicationsspecifically China, North Korea, and now North Vietnam. McNamara took advantage of Morses imprecision and concentrated on the senators connection between 34A and Desoto, squirming away from the issue of U.S. involvement in covert missions by claiming that the Maddox "was not informed of, was not aware [of], had no evidence of, and so far as I know today had no knowledge of any possible South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands Senator Morse referred to." WebMany historians now agree that the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which many believed North Vietnamese ships had attacked American naval forces, may not have occurred in the way it was described at the time. Historians still argue about what exactly happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964. The House passed the resolution unanimously.17 Maddox detected the torpedo boats on radar at a range of almost 20,000 yards and turned away at its top speed of 32 knots. When the boats reached that point, Maddox fired three warning shots, but the torpedo boats continued inbound at high speed. Because the North Vietnamese had fewer than 50 Swatows, most of them up north near the important industrial port of Haiphong, the movement south of one-third of its fleet was strong evidence that 34A and the Desoto patrols were concerning Hanoi. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." Although North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap admitted in a 1984 discussion with Robert S. McNamara that the first attack was deliberate, he denied that a second attack had ever taken place. Media reporting on the NSA reports assessments sparked a brief rehash of the old arguments about the Gulf of Tonkin. They were nicknamed "gassers" because they burned gasoline rather than diesel fuel. The stakes were high because Hanoi had beefed up its southern coastal defenses by adding four new Swatow gunboats at Quang Khe, a naval base 75 miles north of the DMZ, and ten more just to the south at Dong Hoi. But by the end of June, the situation had changed. "We believe that present OPLAN 34A activities are beginning to rattle Hanoi," wrote Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "and [the] Maddox incident is directly related to their effort to resist these activities. LBJ was looking for a pretext to go to Congress to ask for a resolution that would give him the authority to do basically whatever the hell he wanted to do in Vietnam, without the intense public debate that a declaration of war would have required, says historian Chris Oppe. Hanoi at the time denied all, leading to a third interpretation that remains alive today as what might be called the Stockdale thesis. While I was in training, my motivation was to get these wings and I wear them today proudly, the airman recalled in 2015. After 15 minutes of maneuvering, the F-8s arrived and strafed the North Vietnamese boats, damaging two and leaving the third dead in the water. WebGulf of Tonkin conspiracy. Four boats, PTF-1, PTF-2 (the American-made patrol boats), PTF-5, and PTF-6 (Nasty boats), were on their way to bombard a North Vietnamese radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post on the banks of the nearby Ron River, both about 90 miles north of the DMZ. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration Ogier then opened fire at 1508 hours, when the boats were only six minutes from torpedo range. If there had been any doubt before about whose hand was behind the raids, surely there was none now. Both of these messages reached Washington shortly after 1400 hours EDT. Navy, Of course, none of this was known to Congress, which demanded an explanation for the goings-on in the Tonkin Gulf. Shortly after ordering the airstrikes, Johnson went on television and addressed the nation regarding the incident. Midday on August 1, NSGA San Miguel, the U.S. Marine Corps SIGINT detachment co-located with the U.S. Army at Phu Bai, and Maddoxs own DSU all detected the communications directing the North Vietnamese torpedo boats to depart from Haiphong on August 2. Gulf Of Tonkin Given the maritime nature of the commando raids, which were launched from Da Nang, the bulk of the intelligence collecting fell to the Navy. Retrieved from https://www.thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345. In 2005 documents were released proving that Johnson had fabricated the Gulf of Tonkin incident in order to justify attacking North Vietnam. Both men believed an attack on the American ships was imminent. A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. Then North Vietnams naval authorities either became confused or were seized by indecision. Neither ships crew knew about the North Vietnamese salvage operation. It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. As the torpedo boats continued their high-speed approach, Maddox was ordered to fire warning shots if they closed inside 10,000 yards. . The Gulf of Tonkin incident - Vietnam War